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Abstract
In this paper, we present a generic approach that can be used to infer how subjects make optimal decisions under
uncertainty. This approach induces a distinction between a subject’s perceptual model, which underlies the representation
of a hidden ‘‘state of affairs’’ and a response model, which predicts the ensuing behavioural (or neurophysiological)
responses to those inputs. We start with the premise that subjects continuously update a probabilistic representation of the
causes of their sensory inputs to optimise their behaviour. In addition, subjects have preferences or goals that guide
decisions about actions given the above uncertain representation of these hidden causes or state of affairs. From a Bayesian
decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations are so-called ‘‘posterior’’ beliefs, which are influenced by
subjective ‘‘prior’’ beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a ‘‘loss’’ (or ‘‘utility’’) function, which measures the
cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden) state of affair. By assuming that subjects make
optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of
observed behaviour. Critically, this enables one to ‘‘observe the observer’’, i.e. identify (context- or subject-dependent) prior
beliefs and utility-functions using psychophysical or neurophysiological measures. In this paper, we describe the main
theoretical components of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic
predictions). In a companion paper (‘Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide’), we describe a concrete
implementation of it and demonstrate its utility by applying it to simulated and real reaction time data from an associative
learning task.
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Introduction
This paper is about making inferences based on behavioural
data in decision-making experiments. Unlike the analysis of most
other types of data, behavioural responses made by subjects are
themselves based on (perceptual) inferences. This means we have
the special problem of making inferences about inferences (i.e.,
meta-inference). The basic idea we pursue is to embed perceptual
inference in a generative model of decision-making that enables us,
as experimenters, to infer the probabilistic representation of
sensory contingencies and outcomes used by subjects. In one sense
this is trivial; in that economic and computational models of
decision-making have been optimized for decades, particularly in
behavioural economics and neuroimaging (e.g. [1–3]). However,
we address the slightly deeper problem of how to incorporate
subjects’ inferences per se. This speaks to a growing interest in how
the brain represents uncertainty (e.g., probabilistic neuronal codes
([4]) and acts as an inference machine ([5–7]). Furthermore, we
are interested in a general framework that can be adapted to most
experimental paradigms. We hope to show that suitably
formulated models of perception and decision-making enable
inference on subjective beliefs, even when using data as simple as
reaction times. In a companion paper (‘Observing the observer
(II): deciding when to decide’, we illustrate the approach using
reaction times to make inferences about the prior beliefs subjects
bring to associative learning tasks and how these are expressed
behaviourally in the context of speed-accuracy trade-offs.
One may wonder: why the emphasis on perceptual inference?
We live in a world of uncertainty and this has led many to suggest
that probabilistic inference may be useful for describing how the
brain represents the world and optimises its decisions (e.g. [8] or
[9]). A growing body of psychophysical evidence suggests that we
behave as Bayesian observers; i.e. that we represent the causes of
sensory inputs by combining prior beliefs and sensory information
in a Bayes optimal fashion. This is manifest at many temporal and
processing scales; e.g., low-level visual processing ([10–16]),
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multimodal sensory integration ([17–21]), sensorimotor learning
([22–27]), conditioning in a volatile environment ([28–29]),
attention ([30–31]), and even reasoning ([32–33]). This Bayesian
observer assumption provides principled constraints on the compu-
tations that may underlie perceptual inference, learning and
decision-making.
In order to describe behavioural responses within a Bayesian
decision theoretic framework (see e.g. [34]) one has to consider
two levels of inference. Firstly, at the subject level: a Bayesian
subject or observer relies on a set of prior assumptions how
sensory inputs are caused by the environment. In the following,
we will call this mapping, from environmental causes to sensory
inputs, the perceptual model. Secondly, at the experimenter level: as
we observe the observer, we measure the consequences of their
posterior belief about sensory cues. In the following, we will call
this mapping, from sensory cues to observed responses, the
response model. Crucially, the response model subsumes the
perceptual model because the perceptual model determines the
subject’s beliefs and responses. This means inverting the response
model (to map from responses to their causes) necessarily
incorporates an inversion of the perceptual model (to map from
sensory cues to the beliefs that cause those responses). When
measuring explicit actions (i.e., the subject’s decisions), the
response model also invokes utility- or loss-functions, which
encode the subject’s goals and preferences.
The perceptual model predicts the subject’s sensory signals (i.e.
inputs arising from environmental causes), and the response model
predicts the subject’s responses in terms of behaviour (e.g.
decisions or reaction times) and/or neurophysiology (e.g. brain
activity). For example, in the context of an associative learning
paradigm, the unknown quantities in the perceptual model are
causal associations among stimuli; whereas the unknown variables
in the response model are the brain’s representations of these
associations (i.e. the brain states that encode posterior beliefs) and/
or the ensuing behavioural responses (depending on which
measurements are available). Critically, the response model
subsumes the perceptual model, how it is inverted and how the
ensuing posterior belief maps to measurable responses (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Conditional dependencies in perceptual and response models. The lines indicate conditional dependence among the variables in
each model (broken lines indicate probabilistic dependencies and solid lines indicate deterministic dependencies). Left: perceptual and response
models. Right: Implicit generative model, where the perceptual model is assumed to be inverted under ideal Bayesian assumptions to provide a
mapping (through recognition) from sensory input to observed subject responses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015554.g001
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The distinction between these two models is important. In
perceptual learning studies, the experimenter is interested in both
the perceptual model and the mechanics of its inversion. For
example, the computational processes underlying low-level vision
may rest on priors that finesse ambiguous perception (e.g. [16]).
The relevant variables (e.g. those encoding prior beliefs) are
hidden and can only be inferred through experimental observa-
tions using a response model. Conversely, in decision-making
studies, the experimenter is usually interested in the response
model, because it embodies the utility- or loss-functions and
policies employed by the subject (e.g., see [26] for an application to
the motor system). Note that the response model may (implicitly)
subsume the subject’s perceptual model of the world, under which
expected utility is evaluated. This dependency induces the Inverse
Bayesian Decision Theoretic (IBDT) problem: to determine a
subject’s prior beliefs and goals (i.e. loss-function), given their
observed behaviour to known sensory inputs.
The complete class theorem states that any admissible decision
rule is Bayes-optimal for at least one set of prior beliefs and loss-
function [34]. This means that there is always a solution to the
IBDT problem. It is also known from game theory that many
combinations of beliefs and preferences are consistent with the
same behaviour [35]. In other words, the solution to the IBDT
problem exists but is not unique; i.e. the problem is under-
determined or ill-posed [36]. This has led researchers to focus on
restricted classes of the general IBDT problem. These schemes
differ in terms of the constraints that are used to overcome its
indeterminacy; for example, inverse decision theory ([37,26]),
inverse game theory ([38]), inverse reinforcement learning ([39–
41]) or inverse optimal control ([42]). However, these schemes are
not optimally suited for the kind of experiments commonly used in
neuroscience, behavioural economics or experimental psychology,
which usually entail partial knowledge about the beliefs and losses
that might underlie observed behaviour.
This paper proposes an approximate solution to the IBDT
problem for these types of experimental paradigms. The approach
derives from a variational Bayesian perspective ([43]), which is used
both at the subject level (to model perceptual inference or learning)
and at the experimenter level (to model behavioural observations).
The approach allows one to estimate model parameters and
compare alternative models of perception and decision-making in
terms of their evidence. We will first recall the IBDT problem and
then describe the basic elements of the framework. Finally, we will
discuss the nature of this meta-Bayesian approach. A practical
implementation of it is demonstrated in a companion paper
(‘Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide’).
Methods
In this section, we present the basic elements of the framework.
We first recall the prerequisites of Bayesian Decision Theory as
generically and simply as possible. We then describe the form of
perceptual models and their (variational) Bayesian inversion. This
inversion provides an implicit mapping from cues to internal
representations and describes recognition under the Bayesian
observer assumption. We then consider response models for
behaviourally observed decisions, which subsume Bayes optimal
recognition. Finally, we will cover the inversion of response
models, which furnishes an approximate (variational) Bayesian
solution to the IBDT problem.
Inverse Bayesian Decision Theory (IBDT)
We start with a perceptual model m(p) that specifies the subject’s
probabilistic assumptions about how sensory inputs are generated.
Sensory inputs u (experimental stimuli) are generated from hidden
causes x (experimental factors or states) and are expressed in terms
of two probability density functions: the observer’s (subject’s)
likelihood function p u x,m(p)
  and prior beliefs about hidden
states of the world p x m(p)
 . In the following, we will use ‘‘hidden
causes’’, ‘‘environmental states’’ or ‘‘states of affairs’’ as inter-
changeable terms. The hidden states are unknown to the subject
but might be under experimental control. For example, in the
context of associative learning, sensory information u could consist
of trial-wise cue-outcome pairings, and x might encode the
probabilistic association between cues and outcomes that is hidden
and has to be learnt.
The subject’s likelihood quantifies the probability of sensory
input given its hidden cause. The priors encode the subject’s belief
about the hidden states before any observations are made. The
likelihood and priors are combined to provide a probabilistic
model of the world:
pq u,x m
(p)
 ~pq u x,m(p) pq x m(p)  ð1Þ
where we have used the notation pq :ð Þ to indicate a parameter-
ization of the likelihood and priors by some variables q. These
perceptual parameters encode assumptions about how states and
sensory inputs are generated. We assume that q have been
optimised by the subject (during ontogeny) but are unknown to the
experimenter.
Bayesian inversion of this perceptual model corresponds to
recognising states generating sensory input and learning their causal
structure. This recognition is encoded by the subject’s posterior
density; pq x u,m
(p)
 , which obtains from Bayes’ rule:
pq x u,m
(p)
 ~ pq u,x m(p)
 
pq u m(p)jð Þ
pq u m
(p)
 ~ ð pq u,x m(p) dx
ð2Þ
Here, pq u m
(p)
  is the marginal likelihood of sensory inputs u
under the perceptual model m(p), i.e. the (perceptual) model
evidence (where the perceptual parameters q have been integrated
out). Bayes’ rule allows the subject to update beliefs over hidden
states from the prior pq x m
(p)
  to the posterior pq x u,m(p)  on
the basis of sensory information (encoded by the likelihood
pq u x,m
(p)
 ). Since the posterior represents information about the
hidden states given some sensory inputs, we will refer to it as a
representation.
We can describe recognition as a mapping from past sensory
inputs u?t: u1, . . . ,utf g to the current representation: u?t?
pq x u?t,m
(p)
 , where t indexes time or trial. The form of Equa-
tions (1) and (2) mean that representations pq x u1,m
(p)
 , . . . ,
pq x u?t,m
(p)
 g form a Markovian sequence, where pq x u?tj ,ð
m(p)Þ!pq ut xj ,m(p)
 
pq x u?t{1,m
(p)
 . In other words, the cur-
rent belief depends only upon past beliefs and current sensory
input.
Subjects’ responses may be of a neurophysiological and/or
behavioural nature and may reflect perceptual representations or
explicit decisions. In the latter case, we need to model the mapping
from representations to action, pq x u,m
(p)
 ?a, which we call the
response model. This entails specifying the mechanisms through
which representations are used to form decisions. Within a
Bayesian decision theoretic (BDT) framework, policies rely on
some form of rationality. Under rationality assumptions, the
subject’s policy (i.e. decision) is determined by a loss-function,
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‘h x,að Þ, which returns the cost incurred by taking action a while
the state of affairs is x. The loss-function is specified by some
parameters h that are unknown to the experimenter. In the
economics and reinforcement learning literature one usually refers
to utility, which is simply negative loss. BDT gives the rational
policy, under uncertainty about environmental states, in terms of
the optimal action a :~a h,q,uð Þ that minimizes posterior risk
Qh að Þ; i.e. expected loss:
a~argmin
a
Qh að Þ
Qh að Þ~
ð
‘h x,að Þpq x u,m(p)
 dx ð3Þ
where the expectation is with regard to the posterior density on the
hidden states. This renders optimal decisions dependent upon both
the perceptual model m(p) and the loss-function ‘.
The complete-class theorem ([34]) states that any given policy
or decision-rule is optimal for at least one pairing of model and
loss-function m(p),‘
 
. Crucially, this pair is never unique; i.e. the
respective contribution of the two cannot be identified uniquely
from observed behaviour. This means that the inverse Bayesian
decision theoretic (IBDT) problem is ill-posed in a maximum
likelihood sense. Even when restricted to inference on the loss-
function (i.e., when treating the perceptual model as known) it can
be difficult to solve (e.g., see [39] or [40]). This is partly because
solving Equations 2 and 3 is analytically intractable for most
realistic perceptual models and loss-functions. However, this does
not mean that estimating the parameters q and h from observed
behaviour is necessarily ill-posed: if prior knowledge about the
structure of the perceptual and response models is available we can
place priors on the parameters. The ensuing regularisation
facilitates finding a unique solution.
In the following, we describe an approximate solution based upon
a variational Bayesian formulation of perceptual recognition. This
allows us to find an approximate solution to Equation 2 and simplify
the IBDT problem for inference on subject-specific cognitive
representations that underlie behaviourally observed responses.
Variational treatment of the perceptual model
Variational Bayesian inference furnishes an approximate
posterior density on the hidden states q x ljð Þ&pq x u?t,m(p)
 ,
which we assume to be encoded by some variables l:l u,qð Þ in
the brain. These are the sufficient statistics (e.g., mean and
variance) of the subject’s posterior belief. They encode the
subject’s representation and depend on sensory inputs and
parameters of the perceptual model. Recognition now becomes
the mapping from sensory inputs to the sufficient statistics
lt u,qð Þ : u?t {?q lt. We will refer to lt as the representation at
time (or trial) t. In variational schemes, Bayes’ rule is implemented
by optimising a free-energy bound F
(p)
t on the log-evidence for a
model, where by Jensen’s inequality
lt(u,q)~ argmax
l
F
(p)
t
F
(p)
t ~
ð
q xt ljð Þ ln
p u?t,xt m
(p)
 
q xt ljð Þ dxt ƒ ln p u?t m
(p)
  ð4Þ
Maximizing the perceptual free-energy F
(p)
t minimizes the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the exact pq x u?t,m
(p)
 
and approximate q x ltjð Þ posteriors. Strictly speaking, the free-
energy in this and subsequent equations of this paper should be
called ‘‘negative free-energy’’ due to its correspondence to
negative Helmholtz free-energy in statistical physics. For brevity,
we will only refer to ‘‘free-energy’’ throughout the paper and omit
‘‘negative’’ when relating recognition and inference to maximisa-
tion of free-energy. Under some simplifying assumptions about the
approximate posterior, this optimization is much easier than the
integration required by Bayes’ rule (Equation 2). Appendix S1 of
this document summarizes the typical (e.g. Laplace) approxima-
tions that are required to derive such an approximate but
analytical inversion of any generative model. In short, within a
variational Bayesian framework, recognition can be reduced to
optimizing the (free-energy) bound on the log-evidence with
respect to the sufficient statistics l of the approximate posterior
(e.g., first and second order moments of the density).
As a final note on the perceptual model, it is worth pointing out
that recognition, i.e. the sequence of representations,
l u,qð Þ~ l1,l2, . . .f g, has an explicit Markovian form:
lt~f lt{1,ut,qð Þ
f : lt{1? argmax
lt
F
(p)
t
Lf
Llt{1
~{
L2F (p)t
Ll2t
" #{1
L2F (p)t
LltLlt{1
ð5Þ
where the evolution function f : lt{1 {?
q,ut
lt is analytical and
depends on the perceptual model through the perceptual free
energy. Note that the last line of equation 5 is obtained with the
use of implicit derivatives. In summary, recognition can be
formulated as a finite-dimensional analytical state-space model (c.f.
Equation 5), which, as shown below, affords a significant
simplification of the IBDT problem. Note that under the Laplace
approximation (see Appendix S1), the sufficient statistics l are
simply the mode of the approximate posterior, and the gradient of
the evolution function w.r.t. l writes:
Lf
Llt{1
~St
L2F (p)t
LltLlt{1
ð6Þ
where St is the second-order moment of the approximate posterior
(the covariance matrix), which measures how uncertain are
subjects about the object of recognition. This is important since
it means that learning effects (i.e. the influence of the previous
representation onto the current one) are linearly proportional to
perceptual uncertainty (as measured by the posterior variance).
The response model
To make inferences about the subject’s perceptual model we
need to embed it in a generative model of the subject’s responses.
This is because for the experimenter the perceptual representa-
tions are hidden states; they can only be inferred through the
measured physiological or behavioural responses y that they cause.
The response model m rð Þ can be specified in terms of its likelihood
(first equation) and priors (second equation)
p yjh,q,u,m(r) ~P
t
p yt h,q,u,m
(r)
 
p h,q m(r)
 ~p q m(r) p h m(r)  ð7Þ
Note that the observed trial-wise responses y1,y2, . . .f g are
conditionally independent, given the current representation. The
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unknown parameters h of the response model determine how the
subject’s representations are expressed in measured responses (and
include the parameters of any loss-function used to optimise the
response; see below). The priors p h,q m(r)
  cover the parameters
of both the response and perceptual models. The dependence of
the response model m(r) upon the perceptual model m(p) is implicit
in the form of the recognition process lt u,q,m
(p)
 
.
This paper deals with neuroscientific measurements of physio-
logical or behavioural responses. For this class of responses, the
form of the likelihood of the response model can be described by a
mapping g lt,hð Þ : lt {?h yt from the representation to the
measurement. For example, the response likelihood can be
expressed as the state-space model
yt~g lt,hð Þzet
lt~f lt{1,ut,qð Þ
)
[p yt h,q,u,m(r)
 ~N g lt u,qð Þ,hð Þ,Uð Þ ð8Þ
where h are response parameters that are required to specify the
mapping and ek is a zero-mean Gaussian residual error with
covariance U. The evolution function f models the time (or trial)
dependent recognition process (see Equation 5 above). The
observation mapping g could be a mapping between representa-
tions and neuronal activity as measured with EEG or fMRI (see
e.g. [7]), or between representations and behavioural responses
(e.g. [44]). In the context of IBDT, the measured response is an
action or decision that depends on the representation. Rationality
assumptions then provide a specific (and analytic) form for the
mapping to observed behaviour
g : lt? argmin
a
Qh a,ltð Þ
Lg
Llt
~{
L2Qh
La2
" #{1
L2Qh
LaLlt
Qh a,ltð Þ~Eq x ltjð Þ ‘h x,að Þ½ 
ð9Þ
where Qh a,ltð Þ is the posterior risk (Equation 3). In economics and
reinforcement learning decisions are sometimes considered as
being perturbed by noise (see, e.g. [23]) that scales with the
posterior risk of admissible decisions. The response likelihood that
encodes the ensuing policy then typically takes the form of a logit
or softmax (rather than max) function.
To invert the response model we need to specify the form of the
loss-function ‘h x,að Þ so that the subject’s posterior risk Qh a,ltð Þ
can be evaluated. We also need to specify the perceptual model
m pð Þ and the (variational Bayesian) inversion scheme that
determine the subject’s representations. Given the form of the
perceptual model (that includes priors) and the loss-function (that
encodes preferences and goals), the observed responses depend
only on the perceptual parameters q (that parameterize the
mapping of sensory cues to brain states) and response parameters h
(that parameterize the mapping of brain states to responses).
Having discussed the form of response models, we now turn to
their Bayesian selection and inversion.
Variational treatment of the response model
Having specified the response model in terms of its likelihood
and priors, we can recover the unknown parameters describing the
subject’s prior belief and loss structure, using the same variational
approach as for the perceptual model (see Appendix S1):
r(h,q)~ argmax
r
F (r)
F (r)~
ð
r(h,q) ln
p y,h,q u,m(r)
 
r(h,q)
dhdqƒln p y u,m(r),m(p)
 
p y,h,q u,m(r),m(p)
 ~p y h,q,u,m(r),m(p) p h m(r) p q m(p) 
ð10Þ
This furnishes an approximate posterior density r h,qð Þ on the
response and perceptual parameters.
Furthermore, we can use the free-energy F (r) as a lower bound
approximation to the log-evidence for the i-th perceptual model,
under the j-th response model
F
(r)
ij &ln p y u,m
(r)
j ,m
(p)
i
  ð11Þ
Note that F (r) as an approximation to the evidence of the
response model should not be confused with the perceptual free
energy F (p) in Equation 4. This bound can be evaluated for all
plausible pairs of perceptual and response models, which can then
be compared in terms of their evidence in the usual way. Crucially,
the free-energy F (r) accounts for any differences in the complexity
of the perceptual or response model [45]. Furthermore, this
variational treatment allows us to estimate the perceptual
parameters, which determine the sufficient statistics l of the
subject’s representation. This means we can also estimate the
subject’s posterior belief, while accounting for our (the experi-
menter’s) posterior uncertainty about the model parameters
q^ x ljð Þ&q x Er q,hð Þ l½ 
  ð12Þ
where r q,hð Þ&p q,h y,m(r)  is the variational approximation to
the marginal posterior of the perceptual parameters, obtained by
inverting the response model (see Equation 10). In general,
equation 12 means that our estimate of the subject’s uncertainty
may be ‘‘inflated’’ by our experimental uncertainty (c.f. equation
23 below and discussion section).
Lastly, the acute reader might have noticed that there is a link
between the response free energy and the perceptual free energy.
Under the Laplace approximation (see Appendix S1), it actually
becomes possible to write the former as an analytical function of
the latter:
F (r)~{
1
2
e^TU{1e^{
1
2
e^q
TSq
{1e^q{
1
2
e^h
TSh
{1e^h{
1
2
ln Uj j
{
1
2
ln Sqj j{ 1
2
ln Shj jz 1
2
ln S(r)
 z p{n
2
l
e^~y{g argmax
l
F (p) q^
 
,h^
	 

e^q~q^{E q m
(r)
 
e^h~h^{E h m
(r)
 
ð13Þ
where the response model is of the form given in equation 8 and
we have both assumed that the residuals covariance U was known
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and dropped any time/trial index for simplicity. In equation 13, e^
is the estimated model residuals and e^q (respectively, e^h) is the
estimated deviations of the perceptual (respectively, response)
parameters to their prior expectations E q m(r)
  (respectively,
E h m(r)
 ), under the response model. These prior expectations (as
well as any precision hyperparameters of the response model) can
be chosen arbitrarily in order to inform the solution of the IBDT
problem, or optimized in a hierarchical manner (see for example
companion paper). Note that S(r) is the second-order moment
(covariance matrix) of the approximate posterior r q,hð Þ over the
perceptual and response parameters (whose dimension is p), n is
the dimension of the data and e is the response model residuals (see
equation 8). The posterior covariance S(r) quantifies how well
information about perceptual and response model parameters can
be retrieved from the (behavioural) data:
S(r)~
Lg
Lh

T
h^
U{1
Lg
Lh

h^
zS{1h
Lg
Lh

T
h^
U{1
Lg
Lq

q^
Lg
Lq

T
q^
U{1
Lg
Lh

h^
Lg
Lq

T
q^
U{1
Lg
Lq

q^
zS{1q
2
66664
3
77775
{1
Lg
Lh
~{
L2Qh
La2
" #{1
L2Qh
LaLh
Lg
Lq
~
L2Qh
La2
" #{1
L2Qh
LaLl
L2F (p)
Ll2
" #{1
L2F (p)
LlLq
ð14Þ
where Sh (respectively, Sq) is the prior covariance matrix of the
response (respectively, perceptual) parameters. Equation 14 is
important, since it allows one to analyze potential non-identifia-
bility issues, which would be expressed as strong non-diagonal
elements in the posterior covariance matrix S(r).
It can be seen from equation 14 that, under the Laplace
approximation, the second-order moment S(r) of the approximate
posterior density r q,hð Þ over perceptual and response model
parameters is generally dependent upon its first-order moment
q^,h^
 
. The latter, however, is simply found by minimizing a
regularized sum-of-squared error:
q^,h^
 
~ argmin
q,hð Þ
eTU{1ezeTqS
{1
q eqze
T
hS
{1
h eh ð15Þ
Note that equation 15 does not hold for inference on
hyperparameters (e.g., residual variance U). In this case,
variational Bayesian under the Laplace approximation iterates
between the optimization of parameters and hyperparameters,
where the latter basically maximize a regularized quadratic
approximation to Equation 13. We refer the interested reader to
the Appendix S1 of this manuscript, as well as to [46].
Results
A simple perception example
Consider the following toy example: subjects are asked to
identify the mean of a signal u using the fewest samples of it as
possible. We might consider that their perceptual model m(p) is of
the following form:
m(p) :
p us x,m
(p)
 ~N x,1ð Þ Vs~1,:::,n
p x m(p)
 ~N 0,q{1 
(
ð16Þ
where x is the unknown mean of the signal us, s indexes the
samples (s~1, . . . ,n), q is the prior precision of the mean signal
(unknown to us) and we have assumed that subjects know the
(unitary) variance of the signal. In this example, q is our only
perceptual parameter, which will be shown to modulate the
subject’s observed responses. The loss function of this task is a
trade-off between accuracy and number of samples and could be
written as:
‘h x,x,nð Þ~ x{xð Þ2zhn ð17Þ
where x is the subject’s estimator of the mean of the signal and h
balances the accuracy term with the (linear) cost of sampling size n.
Subjects have to choose both a sampling size n and an estimator x
of the mean signal, which are partly determined by our response
parameter h. We now ask the question: what can we say about the
subject’s belief upon the signal mean, given its observed
behaviour?
Under the perceptual model given in equation 16, it can be
shown that the perceptual free energy, having observed n samples
of the signal, has the following form:
F (p)n ~{
1
2
Xn
s~1
us{mð Þ2{qm2z 1{nð Þln 2pzlnq{lnC
 !
ð18Þ
where the optimal sufficient statistics l~ m,Cð Þ of the subject’s
(Gaussian) posterior density q x ljð Þ~p x u?n,m(p)
  of the mean
signal are given by:
q x ljð Þ~N m,Cð Þ :
m:m nð Þ~C nð Þ Pn
s~1
us
C:C nð Þ~ 1
qzn
8><
>: ð19Þ
Equation 19 shows that the posterior precision grows linearly
with the number of samples.
Under the loss function given in equation 17, it is trivial to show
that the posterior risk, having observed n samples of the signal, can
then be written as:
Qh l,x,nð Þ~ x{m nð Þð Þ2zC nð Þzhn ð20Þ
From equation 19, it can be seen that the optimal estimator of
the mean signal is always equal to the its posterior mean, i.e.:
x ~m nð Þ, where n is the optimal sample size:
n~ argmin
n
Qh l,x  ,nð Þ
~h{
1
2{q
ð21Þ
We consider that both the chosen mean signal estimator and the
sample size are experimentally measured, i.e. the response model
has the following form:
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m(r) :
p y h,q,m(r)
 ~N g h,l qð Þð Þ,Uð Þ
g h,l qð Þð Þ~
x ~h12 P
s
us
n ~h{12{q
2
64
3
75
p h,q m(r)
 !1
8>>>><
>>>>>:
ð22Þ
where U is the variance of the response model residuals, g is the
mapping from the representation of the mean signal (as
parameterized by the sufficient statistics l) to the observed choices
and we have used non informative priors on both perceptual and
response parameters. Following equation 14, it can be shown that,
under the Laplace approximation, the experimenter’s posterior
covariance on the perceptual and response parameters is given by:
S(r)~
UP
s
us
	 
2
4h^ {2h^{
1
2
{2h^{
1
2
P
s
us
	 
2
zh^{2
2
64
3
75 ð23Þ
where h^,q^
 
is the first-order moment of r h,qð Þ&p h,q y,m(r) ,
the approximate posterior density on the model parameters. These
estimates are found by maximizing their variational energy (c.f.
equation 15). The covariance matrix S(r) in equation 23 should
not be confused with C nð Þ in equation 19, which is the second-
order moment (variance) of the subject’s posterior density over the
mean signal x. The latter is an explicit function of the prior
precision q over the mean. The former measures the precision
with which one can experimentally estimate q, given behavioural
measures y. Following equations 12 and 23, the experimenter
estimate of the subject’s belief about the signal mean can then be
approximated (to first order) as:
q^ x ljð Þ&N h^12
X
s
us , h^
1
2 1z4U
X
s
us
 !{20@
1
A
0
@
1
A ð24Þ
It can be seen from equation 24 that the variance U of the
response model residuals linearly scales our estimate of the
subject’s uncertainty about the signal mean x. This is because we
accounted for our (the experimenter’s) uncertainty about the
model parameters.
A number of additional comments can be made at this point.
First, the optimal sample size given in equation 21 can be
related to evidence accumulation models (e.g. [47–49]). This is
because the sample size n plays the role of artificial time in our
example. As n increases, the posterior variance C nð Þ decreases (see
equation 19) until it reaches a threshold that is determined by h.
This threshold is such that the gain in evidence (as quantified by
the decrease of C nð Þ) just compensates for the sample size cost hn.
It should be noted that there would be no such optimal threshold if
there was no cost to sensory sampling.
Second, it can be seen from equation 23 that our posterior
uncertainty about the model (response and perceptual) parameters
decreases with the power of the sensory signals u. This means that,
from an experimental design perspective, one might want to
expose the subjects with sensory signals with high magnitude.
More generally, the experimenter’s posterior covariance matrix
will always depend onto the sensory signals, through the
recognition process. This means that it will always be possible to
optimize the experimental design with respect to the sensory
signals u, provided that a set of perceptual and response models
are specified prior to the experiment.
Summary
In summary, by assuming that subjects optimise a bound on the
evidence or marginal likelihood p u m(p)
  for their perceptual
model, we can identify a sequence of unique brain states or
representations l encoding their posterior beliefs q x ljð Þ&p x ujð Þ.
This representation, which is conditional upon a perceptual model
m(p), then enters a response model m(r) of measured behavioural
responses y. This is summarised in Figure 1. Solving the IBDT
problem, or observing the observer, then reduces to inverting the
response model, given experimentally observed behaviour. This
meta-Bayesian approach provides an approximate solution to the
IBDT problem; in terms of model comparison for any combina-
tions of perceptual and response models and inference on the
parameters of those models. This is important, since comparing
different perceptual models m
(p)
i (respectively response models) in
the light of behavioural responses means we can distinguish
between qualitatively different prior beliefs (respectively utility/loss
functions) that the subject might use. We illustrate this approach
on an application to associative learning in a companion paper
‘Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide’.
Discussion
We have described a variational framework for solving the
Inverse Bayesian Decision Theory (IBDT) problem in the context
of perception, learning and decision-making. This rests on
formulating a generative model of observed subject responses in
terms of a perceptual-response model pair (Figure 1): Ideal
Bayesian observer assumptions map experimental stimuli to
perceptual representations, under a perceptual model;
m(p) : x{q?u; while representations determine subject responses,
under a response model; m(r) : l{h?y. The central idea of our
approach is to make inversion of the perceptual model (i.e.
recognition: u{q?l) part of the response model. This provides a
complete mapping m(r) : u{q?l{h?y from experimental stimuli
to observed responses.
We have used the term ‘meta-Bayesian’ to describe our
approach because, as they observe the observer, experimenters make
(Bayesian) statistical inferences about subject’s (Bayesian) percep-
tual inferences (i.e., an inference about an inference). In other
words, we solve the inverse problem of how subjects solve theirs.
The subject’s inverse problem is to recognize (estimate) the hidden
causes of their sensory signals, under some prior assumptions (the
perceptual model) about these causes. In contrast, the experi-
menter’s inverse problem is to identify both the subject’s prior
beliefs (which influence their recognition process) and their
preferences (which maps their recognition process to decisions
expressed by observed actions). This is closely related to, but
distinct from, ‘meta-cognition’, where subjects make inferences
about their own inferences (for example, when rating one’s
confidence about a decision). Having said this, some forms of
meta-cognition could be modelled using the proposed meta-
Bayesian framework. For example, theory of mind [50]; i.e. the
ability to identify the beliefs and intentions of others, could also be
framed as solving the inverse problem of how others have solved
theirs (see [51] for a discussion of related issues about bounded
rationality in the context of game theory).
Note that the recognition process u{
q?l is expected to
(strongly?) depend on the subject’s priors about the hidden state
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of affairs, which is shaped by their previous sensory experiences.
This means that we expect the subject’s behaviour to vary
according to their subjective prior beliefs. The latitude afforded by
a dependence on priors is a consequence of optimal perception;
and the nature of perceptual illusions has provided very useful
insights into the structure of priors the brain might use (see e.g.,
[16] or [14]). These experiments can be thought of as having
disclosed ‘effective’ (context-dependent) priors of the brain, in the
sense that they revealed a specific aspect of the highly complex
perceptual model that underlies the brain’s perceptual and
learning machinery. According to the complete class theorem
(see e.g., [34]), there is always at least a set of priors and loss
functions that can explain any observed behaviour. This means
that one might not be able to experimentally refute the hypothesis
that the brain acts as a Bayesian observer. However, one might be
able to experimentally identify the effective priors of this virtual
brain, which should prove useful in robustly predicting behav-
ioural trends.
It is possible (in principle) to use the current framework with
experimental measures of neurophysiological responses (c.f. section
‘The response model’). To do this, one would need to specify the
response model in terms of how neural activity encodes subjective
representations and how brain connectivity subtends recognition
and learning. Such principles have already been proposed as part
of the ‘Bayesian brain’ hypothesis (see, e.g., [7,52,53,13]). In brief,
the perceptual model is assumed to be hierarchically deployed in
sensory cortex. Recognition is mapped onto this anatomical
hierarchy through top-down predictions and bottom-up prediction
error messages between different levels of a hierarchical perceptual
model, to provide a Bayesian variant of predictive coding [6]. Note
that these theories also consider the role of neuromodulators [54–
55] and the nature of motor outputs; i.e. behavioural responses
([22,56,57,58,59]). However, there is an ongoing debate about the
‘‘site’’ of decision-making in the cortex (e.g. [60]) and so far no
comprehensive theory exists that describes, in precise terms, the
neural and computational substrates of high-level decisions and
associated processes, such as the affective value of choices.
Experimental measures of decisions or choices deserve an
additional comment. This is because in this case, care has to be
taken with approximations to the optimal policy, when closed-
form solutions are not available. This might be an acute problem
in control theoretic problems, where actions influence the (hidden)
states of the environment. In this case, the posterior risk becomes a
function of action (which is itself a function of time). Minimizing
the posterior risk then involves solving the famous Bellman
equation (see e.g. [61]), which does not have closed-form solutions
for non-trivial loss-functions. The situation is similar in game
theory, when a subject’s loss depends on the decisions of the other
players. So far, game theory has mainly focussed on deriving
equilibria (e.g. Pareto and Nash equilibria, see [62]), where the
minimization of posterior risk can be a difficult problem.
Nevertheless, for both control and game theoretical cases, a
potential remedy for the lack of analytically tractable optimal
policies could be to compare different (closed-form) approxima-
tions in terms of their model evidence, given observed decisions.
Fortunately, there are many approximate solutions to the Bellman
equation in the reinforcement learning literature; e.g.: dynamic
programming, temporal difference learning and Q-learning ([63–
65]).
The complete class theorem states that there is always a pair of
prior and loss functions, for which observed decisions are optimal
in a Bayesian sense. This means it is always possible to interpret
observed behaviour within a BDT framework (i.e., there is always
a solution to the IBDT problem). Having said this, the proposed
framework could be adapted to deal with the treatment of non-
Bayesian models of learning and decision making. For example,
frequentist models could be employed, in which equation 3 would
be replaced by a minimax decision rule: a ~argmin
a
max
x
‘ x,að Þ.
In this frequentist case, generic statistical assumptions about the
response model residuals (see equations 7 and 8) would enable one
to evaluate, as in the Bayesian case, the response model evidence
(see equations 10 and 11). Since the comparison of any competing
models (including Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian models) is valid
whenever these models are compared in terms of their respective
model evidence with regard to the same experimental data, our
framework should support formal answers to questions about
whether aspects of human learning and decision-making are of a
non-Bayesian nature (cf. [66]).
Strictly speaking, there is no interaction between the perceptual
and the response model, because the former is an attribute of the
subject and the latter pertains to the (post hoc) analysis of
behavioural data. However, this does not mean that neurophys-
iological or behavioural responses cannot feedback to the
recognition process. For example, whenever the observer’s
responses influence the (evolution of the) state of the environment,
this induces a change in sensory signals. This, in turn, affects the
observer’s representation of the environmental states. The subtlety
here is that such feedback is necessarily delayed in time. This means
that at a given instant, only previous decisions can affect the
observer’s representation (e.g., through current sensory signals).
Another instance of meta-Bayesian inference (which we have not
explored here) that could couple the perceptual model to the
response model is when the subject is observing his or herself (cf.
meta-cognition).
The proposed meta-Bayesian procedure furnishes a generic
statistical framework for (i) comparing different combinations of
perceptual and response models and (ii) estimating the posterior
distributions of their parameters. Effectively this allows us to make
(approximate) Bayesian inferences about subject’s Bayesian
inferences. As stated in the introduction, the general IBDT
problem is ill-posed; i.e. there are an infinite number of priors and
loss-function pairs that could explain observed decisions. However,
restricting the IBDT problem to estimating the parameters of a
specific perceptual model (i.e. priors) and loss-function pair is not
necessarily ill-posed. This is because the restricted IBDT problem
can be framed as an inverse problem and finessed with priors (i.e.,
prior beliefs as an experimenter on the prior beliefs and loss-
functions of a subject). As with all inverse problems, the
identifiability of the BDT model parameters depends upon both
the form of the model and the experimental design. This speaks to
the utility of generative models for decision-making: the impact
that their form and parameterisation has on posterior correlations
can be identified before any data are acquired. Put simply, if two
parameters affect the prediction of data in a similar way, their
unique estimation will be less efficient.
Above, we noted (equation 12) that estimates of the subject’s
uncertainty might be inflated by experimental uncertainty. This
may seem undesirable, as it implies a failure of veridical inference
about subjects’ beliefs (uncertainty). However, this non-trivial
property is a direct consequence of optimal meta-Bayesian
inference. The following example may illustrate how experimental
uncertainty induces uncertainty about the subject’s representation:
Say we know that the subject has a posterior belief that, with
90% confidence, some hidden state x lies within an interval
l1+
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
l2
p
, where l1~E x uj½  is their representation of x, and
l2~Var x uj½  is the perceptual uncertainty. Now, we perform an
experiment, measure behavioural responses y, and estimate l1 to
lie within the credible interval l^1+
ﬃﬃﬃ
S
p
, where l^1~E l1 yj½  is our
Observing The Observer: Theory
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15554
experimental estimate of l1 and S~Var m yj½  measures our
experimental uncertainty about it. Then, our estimate of the
subject’s credible interval, when accounting for our experimental
uncertainty about l1, is m^+
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
l2zS
p
. In general, this means that
estimates of the subject’s uncertainty are upper bounds on their
actual uncertainty and these bounds become tighter with more
precise empirical measures.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the importance of experimental
design for identifying (Bayesian decision theoretic) models. This is
because perceptual inference results from interplay between the
history of inputs and the subject’s priors. This means that an
experimenter can manipulate the belief of the observer (e.g.,
creating illusions or placebo effects) and ensure the model
parameters can be quantified efficiently. In our example, the
identifiability of the perceptual and response parameters is
determined by the magnitude of the sensory signals. This can
then be optimized as part of the experimental design. More
generally, the experimental design could itself be optimized in the
sense of maximising sensitivity to the class of priors to be disclosed.
In general, one may think of this as optimizing the experimental
design for model comparison, which can be done by maximizing
the discriminability of different candidate models ([67]).
In summary, the approach outlined in this paper provides a
principled way to compare different priors and loss-functions
through model selection and to assess how they might influence
perception, learning and decision-making empirically. In a
companion paper [68], we describe a concrete implementation
of it and demonstrate its utility by applying it to simulated and real
reaction time data from an associative learning task.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Appendix S1 (‘the variational Bayesian approach’) is
included as ‘supplementary material’. It summarizes the mathe-
matical details of variational approximation to Bayesian inference
under the Laplace approximation.
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